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Abstract—According to many scientists and clinicians, ge-
nomics is the “next big thing” in the field of medicine. On
one hand, decreasing costs in genome sequencing has been
paving the way to better preventive and personalized medicine.
On the other hand, genomic data also raises serious privacy
concerns, as it is the ultimate identifier of an individual and
it contains privacy-sensitive data (e.g., disease predispositions,
ancestry information). Thus, it is necessary to find ways of
using genomic data without abusing the genomic privacy of
individuals. To get a more comprehensive medical assessment,
genomic information must be combined with other clinical and
environmental data (such as demographic information, family
history, disease history, laboratory test results, etc.) that are
also privacy-sensitive (e.g., HIV status of an individual) and
need to be treated as such. Focusing on disease risk tests, in
this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving system for storing
and processing genomic, clinical, and environmental data by
using homomorphic encryption and privacy-preserving integer
comparison. We implement the proposed system using real
patient data and reliable disease risk factors. In particular, we
use 23 genetic and 14 clinical and environmental risk factors
to compute the risk of coronary artery disease in a privacy-
preserving way. Finally, we show the practicality of the proposed
system via a complexity evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The field of medicine is in the middle of a radical upheaval:
As a result of the rapid evolution in genomic research and the
dramatic decrease in the costs of sequencing, the paradigm of
classic medicine has been shifting towards a more personalized
approach. Genomic data provides opportunities for substantial
improvements in diagnosis and preventive medicine. In partic-
ular, it has been shown that an individual’s predisposition to
a disease depends on genomic variations. Already now, some
commercial companies (e.g., 23andMe [1] and Counsyl [2])
provide low-cost (genetic) disease risk tests to their customers
for certain diseases. Even though the genome of an individual
tells much about his disease risks, research also shows that the
non-genomic attributes (described here as clinical and envi-
ronmental data) of the individuals also contribute significantly
to their disease risks. The clinical and environmental data of
an individual can include his demographic information, his
family history (e.g., diseases of his family members), the list
of diseases that he carries, the results of his laboratory tests
(e.g., cholesterol level), etc. Thus, such data should also be
considered along with the individuals’ genomic data when
computing their risk for various diseases [3].
The use of individual genomic, clinical, and environmental
data can be of interest for a large variety of healthcare
stakeholders (here described as medical units), such as (i) a
pharmacist checking if a given drug could be harmful (toxicity,
interactions) for a patient, (ii) a pharmaceutical company
categorizing people based on their risk for a particular disease
in order to identify potential clinical trial participants, (iii) a
regional health ministry determining the fraction of people
at high risk for a particular disease in order to optimize
a population-wide preventive medicine effort, (iv) an online
direct-to-consumer service provider offering individual risk
prediction for various diseases, considering genomic, clinical
and environmental data, or (v) a physician, computing the risk
of a patient for a particular disease for early diagnosis.
On one hand, for all the aforementioned examples (with the
exception of the physician), in order to protect the privacy of
his sensitive data, an individual might not want to directly
provide his genomic data and clinical and environmental
attributes to the medical unit. Furthermore, what is important
for the medical unit (with the exception of the physician)
is the end-result (i.e., risk of the patient for a disease or
the compatibility of a person to a drug); not the individual
attributes of the person that lead to the end-result. Even if the
medical unit is embodied in a physician and the computed
disease risk of a patient is low, the patient would not need
to reveal any further (privacy-sensitive) information to the
physician (if the disease risk is high, then the physician can
extend the test and learn more about the cause of the high
risk, with the consent of the patient). On the other hand, such
(sensitive) data might play an important role in a disease risk
test, hence the inaccuracy (or absence) of such data might
cause incorrect (or misleading) results. Therefore, it is crucial
to use the correct and complete data of the individuals for the
accuracy of such disease risk tests, while still protecting their
privacy.
The digitalization of health records has already become
a fundamental modernization of the healthcare system to
store the clinical and environmental data of the individuals.
Furthermore, private storage techniques for such data have
been intensively addressed and deployed (e.g., Indivo [4] or
Microsoft Healthvault [5]). However, the same is not true for
genomic data. Unfortunately, very little progress has been
made for the protection of genomic information, and no
progress has been made for the privacy-preserving integration
and processing of genomic, clinical, and environmental data.
Because of its extremely sensitive nature, genomic data
has an unprecedented impact on privacy [6]. In particular,
because the genome carries information about a person’s
genetic condition and predispositions to specific diseases, the
leakage of such information could enable abuse and threats.
For example, insurance companies might obtain the genomes
of their clients, or employers might (indirectly) test their
applicants; access to this information could lead to genetic
discrimination or other abuses not yet fully understood. On
the other hand, as we discussed before, genomic data includes
invaluable medical information about individuals, hence it
should be accessed and processed by authorized medical units
for healthcare purposes. Thus, it is very important to protect
individuals’ privacy-sensitive genomic data, while enabling the
access to the authorized parties.
In this work, we propose a system for protecting the privacy
of individuals’ sensitive genomic, clinical, and environmen-
tal information, while enabling medical units to process it
in a privacy-preserving fashion in order to perform disease
risk tests. We introduce a framework in which individuals’
medical data (genomic, clinical, and environmental) is stored
at a storage and processing unit (SPU) and a medical unit
conducts the disease risk test on the encrypted medical data by
using homomorphic encryption and privacy-preserving integer
comparison. The proposed system preserves the privacy of the
individuals’ genomic, clinical, and environmental data from a
curious party at the SPU and from a malicious party (e.g.,
a hacker) at the medical unit when computing the disease
risk. We also implement the proposed system and show its
practicality via a complexity evaluation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we summarize the existing work in genomic privacy and
privacy of medical records. In Section III, we give a brief
background on the tools we use in this paper. In Section IV,
we introduce the system and threat models. In Section V, we
describe the proposed solution in detail. In Section VI, we
show the implementation of the proposed system and discuss
its computational complexity. In Section VII, we conclude the
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
We first summarize the efforts for protecting genomic data
and still enabling its functionality in some genetic tests. Private
string searching (on the DNA sequence) by using a finite state
machine is proposed by Troncoso-Pastoriza, Katzenbeisser,
and Celik [7], and then re-visited by Blanton and Aliasgari [8].
To check the similarities of DNA sequences in a privacy-
preserving way, Jha, Kruger, and Shmatikov propose using
garbled circuits [9], while Bruekers et al. propose using
homomorphic encryption [10]. Baldi et al. make use of
private set intersection [11] for privacy-preserving similarity
check on DNA sequences [12]. Furthermore, Eppstein and
Goodrich propose a privacy-enhanced method for comparing
two compressed DNA sequences [13] by using an invertible
Bloom filter [14]. Different from the above string searching
and comparison methods, Kantarcioglu et al. propose using
homomorphic encryption to perform scientific investigations
on integrated genomic data [15]. Canim, Kantarcioglu, and
Malin propose securing the biomedical data by using cryp-
tographic hardware [16]. Finally, in our preliminary work,
we propose a privacy-preserving scheme for medical tests
and personalized medicine methods that use patients’ genomic
data [17].1
There are also several efforts for protecting the privacy of
clinical and environmental data. Many ad-hoc electronic health
record (EHR) systems use cryptographic protocols to store
medical information in a secure fashion and to define the
access rights of the medical units. Both Narayan, Gagne, and
Safavi-Naini [18] and Alshehri, Radziszowski, and Raj [19]
propose encrypting EHRs based on healthcare providers’ at-
tributes or credentials. Benaloh et al. propose a system with
patient controlled encryption that enables patients both to share
partial access rights with others, and to perform searches over
their records [20]. Few works also explore the possibility of
directly processing the encrypted clinical and environmental
data. For example, Barni et al. propose privacy-protecting
protocols for the classification of medical data [21].
As opposed to the aforementioned efforts, in this paper,
we focus on the privacy-preserving storage and processing
of genomic data, together with clinical and environmental
attributes. More specifically, we show how specific disease
risk tests can be done using genomic data, along with clinical
and environmental data, while still preserving the privacy of
the individuals.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly summarize the main concepts in
genomics, statistics and cryptography that we use in this paper.
A. Genomic Background
The human genome is encoded in a double-stranded he-
lical DNA molecule, as a sequence of nucleotides. Genome
sequencing techniques record the nucleotides by using the
letters A, T, G and C, and the whole human genome includes
approximately 3 billion letters. Around 99.9% of the entire
genome is identical between any two given individuals. The
remaining part (∼ 0.1%) is responsible for many of our inter-
individual differences, for example, in physical appearance
and in susceptibilities to diseases. Human genetic variation
occurs on many levels from gross alterations in the karyotype
to single nucleotide variants [22]. The latter are also called
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) when they are found
to be variable in at least 1% of the individuals in a population.
For example, the two short sequences (i) AAGTCG, and (ii)
AATTCG sampled from two different individual’s genomes
differ at the underlined SNP position.
1More information about our activities in this field can be found at:
http://lca.epfl.ch/projects/genomic-privacy/.
In general, two different alleles (nucleotides found at a
genomic position) are observed for each SNP (the alleles
for the SNP in the aforementioned example are G and T ,
respectively). Furthermore, each individual carries two alleles
at each SNP (one inherited from the mother and one from
the father). If an individual receives the same allele from both
parents, he is said to have a homozygous SNP. If, however,
he inherits a different allele from each parent, he has a
heterozygous SNP. So far, approximately 50 million SNPs
have been identified in the human population [23].
Several studies have assessed both the evolutionary sig-
nificance and medical applications of SNPs. In particular,
Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) have investigated
the impact of SNPs on phenotypic traits, such as diseases, and
have demonstrated associations between particular variants
and disease risks. Each SNP has a different impact on the risk;
some of them contribute to the development of the disease,
whereas some are protective.
As we discussed before, two different alleles are observed
for every SNP. In general, for a SNP that is associated
with a disease, one of these alleles carries the risk for the
corresponding disease and the other allele does not contribute.
For example, assume that the SNP in the above example (with
alleles G and T ) is associated with a particular disease X . Also
assume that out of these two alleles, G is the one carrying the
risk for disease X . That is, the presence of G increases the
risk for disease X . Then, the risk for disease X is the highest
(due to the corresponding SNP) if an individual inherits G
from both of his parents (i.e., if he has a homozygous SNP
carrying two risk alleles). Whereas, the risk is weaker if
he inherits one G and one T , and it is the lowest if he
inherits T from both of his parents.2 For simplicity, in this
paper, we represent (i) an homozygous SNP carrying two non-
contributing alleles as 0, (ii) an heterozygous SNP carrying one
risk (or protective) allele and one non-contributing allele as 1,
and (iii) an homozygous SNP carrying two risk (or protective)
alleles as 2.3 In short, each SNP can be in one of the states
from {0, 1, 2}, and we let SNPPi represent the state (content)
of SNPi (SNP with ID i) for a patient P .
B. Computation of the Disease Risk
The strength of the association between each SNP and a
disease is usually expressed by the odds ratio (OR), where
the odds is the ratio of the probability of occurrence of the
disease to that of its non-occurrence in a specific group of
individuals. Thus, the OR is the ratio of odds in the group
of individuals carrying a genetic variation (exposed) to that
of those who do not carry it (unexposed). In other words, the
OR illustrates by how much the risk of disease is multiplied in
an individual carrying a genetic variation compared to another
individual not carrying the same variation.
When multiple SNPs are associated with a disease, the
overall genetic risk (S) of an individual for the corresponding
2The same holds for protective SNPs.
3The number of alleles carrying the risk is usually called genetic burden.
disease can be computed as a weighted average, based on
the OR of each associated SNP by using a logistic regression
model. This model is currently widely used among the ge-
neticists and medical doctors for disease risk tests. In such a
model, OR of a SNPi (i.e., ORi) is generally represented in
terms of regression coefficient (βi), where ORi = exp(βi).
Then, assuming Prg is the probability that an individual P
will develop a disease X (only considering his genomic data),
his overall genetic risk can be computed as below:4
S = ln(
Prg
1− Prg
) = α+
∑
i∈ϕX
βip
i
j(X), (1)
where pij(X) is the contribution of the SNPi to the genetic
risk (for disease X) when SNPPi = j (SNPPi ∈ {0, 1, 2}
as discussed in Section III-A), and α is the intercept of the
model.
For clinical use, the genetic risk, computed in (1) should be
categorized based on its risk group. For this purpose, generally,
the distribution of the potential genetic scores (in a given
population) is divided into smaller parts called quantiles (or
risk groups) as in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1, there are 4 different risk
groups, each with a different genetic regression coefficient.
For example, if S is somewhere between b1 and b2, then we
assign the genetic regression coefficient for the corresponding
individual as β2. For each individual, the genetic score is
computed as in (1), and positioned into its risk group. We
represent the genetic regression coefficient corresponding to
the genetic risk S as βg .
β1 = ln(OR1)
β2 = ln(OR2) β3 = ln(OR3)
β4 = ln(OR4)
b1 b2 b3
25% 25% 25% 25%
Fig. 1. Genetic score distribution partitioned in 4 genetic risk groups.
As discussed in Section I, to compute the overall disease
risk, the genetic information needs to be combined together
with the clinical and environmental factors. For this purpose,
assuming Pr is the probability of disease X (this time con-
sidering genetic, clinical, and environmental information), a
second and final multi-variable logistic regression model is
used to find the final (aggregate) regression coefficient βf as
below:
ln(
Pr
1− Pr
) = βf = β0 + βg +
∑
Ni∈N
β¯iNi, (2)
where β0 is the new intercept, N is the set of clinical and
environmental attributes associated with the disease, and β¯i
is the regression coefficient corresponding to the clinical or
4In general, a logistic regression model is represented as ln( Pr
1−Pr
) =
α+
∑
i
βiXi. In our model, the explanatory variable Xi is pij .
environmental attribute Ni. From (3), the probability (Pr)
that the corresponding individual will develop disease X
(considering all the genomic, clinical, and environmental data)
can be computed as follows:
Pr =
eβf
1 + eβf
. (3)
C. Cryptographic Background
In this section, we briefly describe two cryptosystems along
with their homomorphic properties: the modified Paillier
cryptosystem (described in detail in [24] and [25]) and the
DGK cryptosystem (described in detail in [26]).
1) Modified Paillier cryptosystem: The Paillier cryptosys-
tem is a public key cryptosystem supporting some homomor-
phic operations. The public key is represented as (n, g, h =
gx), where the strong secret key is the factorization of n = zy
(z, y are safe primes), the weak secret key is x ∈ [1, n2/2],
and g of the order (z − 1)(y − 1)/2. By selecting a random
a ∈ Z∗
n2
, g can easily be computed as g = −a2n.
• Encryption: To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, we first select
a random r ∈ [1, n/4] and generate the ciphertext pair
(C1, C2) as below:
C1 = g
r mod n2 and C2 = hr(1 +mn) mod n2.
(4)
For simplicity, in the rest of this paper, we represent the
Paillier encryption of a message m as [m].
• Decryption: The message m can be recovered from [m]
as follows:
m = ∆(C2/C
x
1 ) (5)
where ∆(u) = (u−1) mod n
2
n
, for all u ∈ {u < n2 | u =
1 mod n}.
• Proxy re-encryption: Assume we randomly split the secret
key in two shares x1 and x2, such that x = x1 + x2.
The modified Paillier cryptosystem enables an encrypted
message (C1, C2) to be partially decrypted to a ciphertext
pair (C˜1, C˜2) using x1 as below:
C˜1 = C1 and C˜2 = C2/Cx11 mod n2. (6)
Then, (C˜1, C˜2) can be decrypted using x2 with the afore-
mentioned decryption function to recover the original
message.
2) DGK cryptosystem: The DGK cryptosystem is opti-
mized for the secure comparison of integers. The key gen-
eration needs three parameters k, t and L where k > t > L.
The parameter k represents the number of bits of the RSA
modulus n, t is the size of two small primes vp and vq , and
L is the message space size in bits. Assume that p and q are
two distinct primes of equal bit length, such that p − 1 is
divisible by vp and q − 1 is divisible by vq . Then, the public
key is represented as (n, g, h, u), where u is a L-bit prime,
g ∈ Z∗n with order uvpvq , and h is an integer with order vpvq .
Furthermore, the private key is represented as (p, q, vp, vq).
For simplicity, in the rest of this paper we represent the DGK
encryption of a message m as 〈m〉.
3) Homomorphic properties: Both modified Paillier and
DGK cryptosystems support some computations in ciphertext
domain. In particular, both cryptosystems have the following
properties:
• The product of two ciphertexts is equal to the encryption
of the sum of their corresponding plaintexts.
• A ciphertext raised to a constant number is equal to the
encryption of the product of the corresponding plaintext
and the constant.
These homomorphic operations are used in our proposed
solution (in Section V) to compute the genetic risk and the
overall disease risk in ciphertext domain.
IV. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODELS
In this work, we propose a system for the privacy-preserving
computation of disease risk by using both genomic data and
clinical and environmental factors. In general, this type of
a medical test involves a patient (P ) and a medical unit
(MU). As we discussed in Section I, the medical unit can
be a pharmacist, a pharmaceutical company, a regional health
ministry, an online direct-to-consumer service provider, or a
physician (for early diagnosis).
We assume that the sequencing and the encryption of the
genomic data of the patient are performed at a certified
institution (CI), which is a trusted entity. We note that such
a trusted entity is indispensable in such a system, as the
sequencing has to be done at an institution to obtain the genetic
variation profile of the patient. Furthermore, the clinical and
environmental data of the patient is collected during his doctor
visits (e.g., at the MU) or directly provided by the patient. As
we discussed before, a patient might not be willing to reveal
all his clinical and environmental data to an MU (e.g., his HIV
status or family history). However, this privacy-sensitive data
can play an important role in the accuracy of the computed
disease risk. The proposed system allows the patient to choose
what part of his clinical and environmental data to hide from
an MU and it still involves such hidden data in the computation
of the disease risk.
We assume that the storage and processing of genomic,
clinical, and environmental data is done at a storage and
processing unit (SPU) for efficiency and security. That is,
instead of several MUs storing the same large amount of
genomic data (tens to hundreds of gigabytes per patient), the
genomic data of the patients is stored at a centralized SPU,
and provided to the MUs upon request. Storing the genomic,
clinical, and environmental data at the SPU also makes such
data available to any MU at any given time (e.g., during
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Fig. 2. Proposed system model for the privacy-preserving computation of
the disease risk.
emergencies). Furthermore, as an MU can be embodied in
several entities from a physician to an online service, it would
be unrealistic to assume that all these different entities will pay
high attention to the security of the data they store. It is easier
therefore to provide the security of the genomic, clinical, and
environmental data of the patients at the SPU.5 We note that a
private company (e.g., cloud storage service), the government,
or a non-profit organization could play the role of the SPU.
The general architecture of the proposed system is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. In summary (it will be described in detail in
Section V), the patient provides his sample for sequencing to
the CI. Meanwhile, he also provides his clinical and environ-
mental data to the SPU and the MU.6 The CI is responsible
for sequencing and encryption of the patient’s genomic data.
Then, the CI sends the encrypted genomic data to the SPU.
Finally, the privacy-preserving computation of the disease risk
takes place between the MU and the SPU.
In this study, we consider the following two types of
potential attackers: (i) an attacker at the MU, and (ii) a
curious party at the SPU. The attacker can be represented by
a careless or disgruntled employee at the MU or a hacker
who breaks into the MU and aims to obtain private genomic,
clinical, and environmental information about a patient (for
which it is not authorized). We also assume that the SPU
might be a curious entity (e.g., existence of a curious party
or a disgruntled employee at the SPU), hence all genomic,
clinical, and environmental data should be stored at the SPU
in encrypted form (i.e., the SPU should not be able to access
the contents of patients’ data). Furthermore, patients’ data is
stored using pseudonyms (without revealing the real identities
of the patients) at the SPU, hence SPU cannot associate a
5For similar reasons, we prefer not to leave patients’ genomic, clinical, and
environmental data in their own hands (e.g., by storing it on their personal
devices).
6As we discussed before, depending on the privacy-sensitivity of the
clinical and environmental data, the patient can choose which clinical and
environmental attributes to reveal to the MU, and which ones to encrypt and
keep at the SPU.
medical test to a patient. Other than being potentially curious,
we assume that the SPU is an honest party. That is, it follows
the protocol properly and does not change the integrity of the
stored data. Finally, we assume that the MU and the SPU do
not collude.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Initialization
The cryptographic keys of each patient (for the modified
Paillier cryptosystem) are generated and distributed to the
patients during the initialization period. Furthermore, the
patient’s secret key x is randomly divided into x1 and x2
(such that x = x1 + x2 as discussed in Section III-C)
and each share is distributed to the SPU and to the MU,
respectively (i.e., x1 is provided to the SPU and x2 to the
MU). Similarly, public and private keys of the SPU for the
DGK cryptosystem are generated and the public key is shared
with the MU. Finally, symmetric keys are established between
the parties (to protect the communication between the parties
from an eavesdropper). We note that the distribution, update
and revocation of cryptographic keys are handled by a trusted
entity.7
B. Sequencing and Clinical and Environmental Data Collec-
tion
The patient provides his sample for sequencing. The sample
is sequenced by the CI with the consent of the patient. The
sequence is further analyzed and the SNPs of the patient
are extracted. We assume that the non-consented sequencing
of the patients’ genomes is forbidden by law. Furthermore,
even if non-consented sequencing using collected samples
of the patients were possible, this type of an attack would
be both low-scale (in terms of the number of victims) and
more importantly, very costly (due to the cost of sequencing
machines) for the attacker.
At the same time, clinical and environmental data of the
patient is collected during his doctor visits or directly provided
by the patient. For example, data about his cholesterol level
or his blood-sugar level is collected during his doctor visits.
Whereas, data such as his age, weight, height, or family history
is provided by the patient.
In contrast with genomic data, some clinical and environ-
mental data (e.g., cholesterol level) of the patient is subject
to frequent changes over time.8 From here on, we call such
clinical and environmental data as the “variable data”. Thus,
upon collection, the variable data is accompanied with a date
(e.g., date of the collection of the data). By doing so, the MU
can decide whether any variable data should be updated by
the patient before the computation of his risk for a disease.
7In this case, the trusted entity can be the certified institution (CI).
8Genomic data also rarely changes (e.g., via mutations). In such cases, the
patient’s genome might need to be sequenced again.
C. Encryption and Storage of Genomic, Clinical, and Envi-
ronmental Data
Encryption of the contents of the SNPs are done at the CI by
using the modified Paillier cryptosystem (Section III-C). We
assume SNPi represents the position (or ID) of a SNP (on the
DNA sequence). We also assume SNPPi represents the content
(or state) of SNPi at patient P , where SNPPi ∈ {0, 1, 2}
(as discussed in Section III-A). After the sequencing and the
extraction of the SNPs of the patient, the CI encrypts the con-
tents of all SNP positions of the patient (to obtain [SNPPi ]9)
along with their squared values (to obtain [(SNPPi )2]). The
squared values of the SNPs are required for the homomorphic
operations (in Section V-D1). Eventually, the CI encrypts the
contents of around 50 million SNP positions for the patient.
Furthermore, the CI also individually encrypts each clinical
and environmental attribute of the patient by using the modi-
fied Paillier cryptosystem (we will further discuss the contents
of clinical and environmental attributes in Section V-D3).
After encryption, the CI sends the encrypted genomic,
clinical, and environmental data (along with the pseudonym
of the patient) to the SPU for storage. We note that only
the contents of the SNPs are encrypted at the CI; not their
positions (on the DNA). Thus, the SPU stores the positions
(or the IDs) of the SNPs in plaintext, mainly to check the
access rights of the MU for the requested SNPs. Similarly, the
identifiers of the clinical and environmental attributes (e.g.,
“age” or “cholesterol level”) and their dates (i.e., collection
date of the variable data) are stored in plaintext at the SPU.
D. Privacy-Preserving Computation of Disease Risk
The computation of a patient’s disease risk is done at the
MU. In the remaining of this section, we will describe how
the MU obtains the risk of patient P for a disease X . The MU
requests the (encrypted) genomic, clinical, and environmental
data of the patient that will be used for the computation of
the disease risk from the SPU (request is done using the
pseudonym of the patient). The SPU then verifies that the MU
has the required access rights for the requested genomic, clini-
cal, and environmental data for the corresponding computation
and sends the requested (encrypted) data to the MU. Along
with the encrypted genomic, clinical, and environmental data,
the positions (or IDs) of the encrypted SNPs and the identifiers
and the collection dates of the clinical and environmental data
are also sent to the MU by the SPU. Looking at the collection
date, MU can decide if the patient needs to update any of his
clinical and environmental data before the computation of the
disease risk.
The MU first computes the regression coefficient corre-
sponding to the genetic risk of the patient for disease X (as
discussed in Section III-B). Then, it combines this with the
clinical and environmental factors and eventually obtains the
9We represent the encryption of a message m using modified Paillier
cryptosystem as [m].
overall risk of the patient to disease X . Next, we describe this
process in detail.
1) Computing the genetic risk: As before, let SNPi rep-
resent the position (or ID) of a SNP, SNPPi represent the
content of the corresponding SNP (SNPPi ∈ {0, 1, 2}), and
βi represent the regression coefficient, thus the strength of the
association between SNPi and disease X . Also, let pij(X) be
the contribution, depending on the content, of the SNPi to
the genetic risk (for disease X) when SNPPi = j. Then, the
MU computes the (encrypted) genetic risk ([S]) of patient P to
disease X using the encrypted SNPs of the patient as below:
[S] =
[ ∑
i∈ϕX
βi
{pi0(X)
χ
(SNPPi − 1)(SNP
P
i − 2) +
pi1(X)
ψ
(SNPPi )(SNP
P
i − 2) +
pi2(X)
µ
(SNPPi )(SNP
P
i − 1)
}]
, (7)
where, χ, ψ, and µ are plaintext normalizing constants.
As we discussed in Section III-B, the MU needs to know on
which genetic risk group (quantile) the above genetic risk is
positioned in order to determine the regression coefficient (βg)
of the computed genetic risk (each risk group contributes the
risk with a different regression coefficient). However, as the
above computed genetic risk is encrypted, to find the regres-
sion coefficient corresponding to the computed genetic risk,
we propose to use a privacy-preserving integer comparison
algorithm [27] between the MU and the SPU.
2) Computing the genetic regression coefficient: The ge-
netic risk distribution consists of ρ genetic risk groups (or
quantiles), each with different regression coefficients (e.g.,
ρ = 4 in Fig. 1). We let bli and bui represent the lower and
upper boundary of the ith risk group of the genetic risk scale,
respectively. In short, MU compares [S] with the boundaries
of the genetic risk scale in a privacy-preserving way, such
that neither the MU nor the SPU learns the value of S or
the result of any comparison. Assume that both S and bji
(j ∈ {l, u}) are L-bit numbers. We summarize the main steps
of the privacy-preserving comparison algorithm below. The
operations in these steps are also illustrated in Fig. 3.
Step 1 (@MU): The MU computes [z] = [2L + S − bji ]. Let
zL−1 represent the most significant bit of z. Then, (i) zL−1 = 0
if S < bji ; and (ii) zL−1 = 1 if S ≥ bji . Thus, the MU needs to
compute [zL−1], where [zL−1] = [z−(z mod 2L)]. However,
the MU cannot compute [z mod 2L] using the homomorphic
properties of the modified Paillier cryptosystem. Thus, the
MU initiates a privacy-preserving comparison protocol with
the SPU to compute [z mod 2L].
The MU generates a random number r and computes [d] =
[z+ r]. Then, the MU partially decrypts [d] using x2 to obtain
˜[d]10 and sends ˜[d] to the SPU.
10Partial decryption using a share of the patient’s secret key is discussed
in Section III-C.
@(MU)
@(SPU)
ii. Generate a “blind factor” r 
and compute [d] = [ z + r ] 
iii. Par!ally decrypt [d] using 
x2 to obtain [ ]
vii. Compute (r mod 2L) and     
[z mod 2L ] =
[d mod 2L - r mod 2L + 2L]
iv. Decrypt [ ] using x1 to 
obtain d
.
.
.
v. Compute (d mod 2L)
vi. Compute [d mod 2L] 
using P’s public key
[ ]
[d mod 2L]
i. Compute [z] = [2L + – bi
j]
Goal: compute [z mod 2L ]
Fig. 3. Privacy-preserving comparison algorithm to determine the risk group
of the genetic score S.
Step 2 (@SPU): The SPU decrypts ˜[d] using x1 to obtain
d. Then, the SPU computes (d mod 2L), encrypts it (via the
patient’s public key using the modified Paillier cryptosystem)
to obtain [d mod 2L], and sends the encrypted value to the
MU.
Step 3 (@MU): The MU computes (r mod 2L) and encrypts
it (via the patient’s public key, by using the modified Pail-
lier cryptosystem) to obtain [r mod 2L]. Then, it computes
[z mod 2L] = [d mod 2L − r mod 2L]. We note that
[z mod 2L] = [z mod 2L] if (d mod 2L) ≥ (r mod 2L).
However, if (r mod 2L) > (d mod 2L), an underflow oc-
curs as the subtraction is done in modulo n (using the ho-
momorphic properties of the modified Paillier cryptosystem).
To avoid this underflow problem, the MU should compute [z
mod 2L] as [z mod 2L] = [z mod 2L + λ2L], where λ = 0
if (d mod 2L) ≥ (r mod 2L), and λ = 1 otherwise. In the
following we describe how the MU computes [λ] with the help
of the SPU.
Computing [λ]: For the efficiency of the protocol, the com-
putation of [λ] relies on the homomorphic encryption scheme
proposed by Damgard et al. [26] (DGK cryptosystem, as
described in Section III-C). Compared to the modified Paillier
cryptosystem, the DGK cryptosystem allows for an efficient
multiplicative masking, as it has a small plaintext space Zu
(where u is a prime number). Similar to modified Paillier,
the DGK cryptosystem also supports the addition of two
ciphertexts and the multiplication of a ciphertext with a
plaintext constant. As discussed before, we represent the DGK
encryption of a message m under the public key of the SPU
as 〈m〉. In the following, we describe the computation of [λ].
We also summarize the main steps in the computation of [λ]
in Fig. 4.
Let dˆ = (d mod 2L) and dˆi represent the ith bit of dˆ
(where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L−1}). In Step 2 of the above protocol,
the SPU also encrypts the bits of dˆ by its public key by using
the DGK encryption to obtain 〈dˆ0〉, . . . , 〈 ˆdL−1〉 and sends
these encrypted bits to the MU.
Similarly, let rˆ = (r mod 2L) and rˆi represent the ith bit
@(MU)
@(SPU)
ii. Encrypt bits of (r mod 2L) 
→
iii. Choose an s randomly
from
iv. Compute as in (8) 
and generate by 
masking and permu!ng 
i. Encrypt bits of  (d mod 
2L) using DGK →
.
.
.
v. Decrypt using DGK 
private key 
vi. Compute  a:
• If ∃! = 0 → a = 0
• If ∀ ≠ 0 → a = 1
vii. Compute [a] via Paillier
viii. Determine [ ]:
• If s = 1 → [ ] = [1-a]
• If s = -1 → [ ] = [a]
.
.
.
Fig. 4. Privacy-preserving comparison protocol to compute [λ] (to determine
whether there is an underflow in the computation of [z mod 2L] in Step 3).
of rˆ (where r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L − 1}). In Step 3 of the above
protocol, the MU encrypts the bits of rˆ under the public key of
the SPU using the DGK encryption to obtain 〈rˆ0〉, . . . , 〈 ˆrL−1〉.
Then, the MU randomly chooses an integer s from the set
{1,−1} and computes C = {〈c0〉, . . . , 〈cL−1〉}, where
〈ci〉 =
〈
dˆi − rˆi + s+ 3
L−1∑
j=i+1
wj
〉
, (8)
and wj = dˆj ⊕ rˆj . We note that 〈dˆj ⊕ rˆj〉 = 〈dˆj + rˆj −
(2rˆj)dˆj〉, hence it can be easily computed at the MU (using
the homomorphic properties of the DGK cryptosystem), as rˆj
values are available to the MU in plaintext. Next, for each 〈ci〉,
the MU selects a random number αi (from Zu) and computes
〈ei〉 = 〈ciαi〉 in order to multiplicatively mask the 〈ci〉 values.
The MU also permutes the ordering of 〈ei〉 values and sends
them to the SPU.
The SPU decrypts the 〈ei〉 values using its private key and
checks for the following two cases: (i) If all ei values are non-
zero, the SPU sets a = 1, and (ii) if exactly one ei value is
zero, the SPU sets a = 0. Then, the SPU encrypts a using the
modified Paillier cryptosystem under the patient’s public key
to obtain [a], and sends this encrypted value to the MU.
We note that if a = 1 and s = 1 (the number randomly
selected by the MU), then dˆ ≥ rˆ (i.e., λ = 0). Similarly, if
a = 0 and s = 1, then rˆ > dˆ (i.e., λ = 1).11 Thus, if s = 1, the
MU sets [λ] = [1− a] and if s = −1, it sets [λ] = [a]. Using
[λ], the MU can compute [z mod 2L], and hence [zL−1] as
we discussed before.
Let [G(S, bui )] = [zL−1] represent the (encrypted) result of
the comparison between S and bui . Then, (i) G(S, bui ) = 0 if
S < bli; and (ii) G(S, bui ) = 1 if S ≥ bli. Given there are ρ
risk groups in the genomic risk scale, using the above privacy-
preserving comparison algorithm, the MU can determine the
genetic regression coefficient (βg) corresponding to S as
11The opposite holds when s = −1.
SNP Chr Allele Risk allele OR
rs3798220 6 T>C C 1.51
rs4977574 9 A>G G 1.29
rs9982601 21 C>T T 1.18
rs17114036 1 A>G A 1.17
rs17465637 1 C>A C 1.14
rs6725887 2 T>C C 1.14
rs1122608 19 G>T G 1.14
rs964184 11 C>G G 1.13
rs12413409 10 G>A G 1.12
rs2306374 3 T>C C 1.12
rs599839 1 A>G A 1.11
rs579459 9 T>C C 1.10
rs12526453 6 C>G C 1.10
rs11556924 7 C>T C 1.09
rs1746048 10 C>T C 1.09
rs12190287 6 C>G C 1.08
rs3825807 15 A>G A 1.08
rs216172 17 C>G G 1.07
rs12936587 17 A>G G 1.07
rs4773144 13 A>G G 1.07
rs17609940 6 G>C G 1.07
rs2895811 14 T>C C 1.07
rs46522 17 T>C T 1.06
TABLE I
GENOMIC VARIANTS (SNPS) USED FOR THE COMPUTATION OF THE
GENETIC RISK FOR THE CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE (CAD) [3]. “CHR”
IS THE CHROMOSOME ON WHICH THE CORRESPONDING SNP IS LOCATED.
“ALLELE” IS THE SET OF NUCLEOTIDES THAT ARE OBSERVED FOR THE
CORRESPONDING SNP (THE FREQUENTLY OBSERVED ALLELE IS THE ONE
ON THE LEFT). “RISK ALLELE” IS THE ALLELE WHICH CARRIES THE RISK
FOR CAD. “OR” IS THE ODDS RATIO OF THE CORRESPONDING SNP PER
RISK ALLELE (E.G., IF THE PATIENT CARRIES TWO RISK ALLELES OF A
PARTICULAR SNP, THE OR BECOMES TWO TIMES THE VALUE INDICATED
IN THE TABLE). AS WE DISCUSSED IN SECTION III-B, THE RELATION
BETWEEN THE OR AND THE REGRESSION COEFFICIENT (βi) OF A SNP i
CAN BE REPRESENTED AS ORi = exp(βi). THE ASSOCIATIONS OF THESE
SNPS TO CAD WERE IDENTIFIED THROUGH A META-ANALYSIS OF
MULTIPLE GENOME-WIDE ASSOCIATION STUDIES (GWAS).
below:
[βg] =
[
β1(1−G(S, b
u
1 )) +
(ρ−1)∑
i=2
βi(G(S, b
u
i−1)−
G(S, bui )) + βρG(S, b
u
ρ−1)
]
, (9)
where βi is the genetic regression coefficient of the ith quartile
(risk group). We note that the above computation can be easily
conducted using the homomorphic properties of the modified
Paillier cryptosystem.
3) Computing the final disease risk: To compute the final
disease risk of the patient, the MU combines [βg] with the
patient’s clinical and environmental regression coefficients to
obtain the aggregate regression coefficient βf . Even though
some clinical and environmental data entries, such as smoking
behavior, can be represented binary (e.g., 1 is the patient
smokes and 0 if he does not), some entries are the results
of medical tests (e.g., cholesterol level) or demographic data
(e.g., age of the patient). To compute the aggregate regression
coefficient of the patient for a particular disease, these en-
tries should be categorized following the requirements of the
medical test. For example, when computing the cardiovascular
disease risk [3] of a patient, the regression coefficient of the
patient’s age takes 2 different values: (i) it gets a higher value if
the patient is over 45; and (ii) it gets a lower value if the patient
is 45 or younger. In this particular example, the encrypted
age of the patient can be compared with 45 to represent this
attribute as a binary value (i.e., 1 if the patient is over 45,
and 0 otherwise). Therefore, similar to before, the MU use a
privacy-preserving integer-comparison algorithm [27] to make
such comparisons for the encrypted clinical and environmental
data, before computing the aggregate regression coefficient of
the patient.12
Let N = {[N1], [N2], . . . , [Nm]} be the set of encrypted
clinical and environmental attributes of the patient (that are
required for the computation of the risk for disease X),
where Ni ∈ {0, 1} for the simplicity of the presentation.
That is, Ni = 1 if the patient has the corresponding clin-
ical or environmental attribute, and Ni = 0 otherwise. As
we discussed before, even if Ni is non-binary, it can be
transformed to a binary number using the privacy-preserving
comparison algorithm (in Section V-D2). Then, the (final)
aggregate regression coefficient of the patient (for disease X)
is computed as below:
[βf ] =
[
β0 + βg +
m∑
i=1
β¯iNi
]
, (10)
where β¯i is the regression coefficient of the ith clinical or
environmental attribute, and β0 is the intercept (as discussed in
Section III-B). This encrypted aggregate regression coefficient
is then sent back to the SPU, where is it partially decrypted by
using x1 to obtain ˜[βf ]. Then, the SPU sends ˜[βf ] back to the
MU, where is it decrypted using x2 to obtain βf . Finally, the
MU computes the final disease risk of the patient for disease
X as e
βf
1+eβf
.
We note that this proposed scheme preserves the privacy
of patients’ genomic data relying on the security strength of
modified Paillier cryptosystem and the DGK cryptosystem.
The extensive security evaluation of the modified Paillier
and DGK cryptosystems can be found in [24] and [26],
respectively.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLEXITY EVALUATION
To evaluate the practicality of the proposed privacy-
preserving algorithm, we implemented it, and assessed its stor-
age requirement and computational complexity. We evaluated
the proposed system using real genomic data. In particular,
we encrypted a real individual’s SNP profile from [28], and
we computed the coronary artery disease (CAD) risk by
using real data (i.e., OR values and genetic risk distribution)
from [3]. In summary, CAD risk computation includes (i) 23
SNPs associated with cardiovascular risk (in Table I) for the
12There might be more than 2 categories for some clinical or environmental
attributes. In this case, the MU needs to determine under which category
the patient’s (encrypted) attribute falls using a similar technique discussed in
Section V-D2.
Variable Odds Ratio
Age (>45 years) 3.21
Current smoking 2.25
Family history of CAD 2.00
Lopinavir (> 1 year) 1.74
Diabetes 1.81
Current abacavir exposure 1.62
Past smoking 1.51
Indinavir (> 1 year) 1.28
High cholesterol 1.61
On ART 1.51
Hypertension 1.44
Low HDL cholesterol 1.11
CD4 0.99
HIV RNA 1.00
Genetic score quantile 2 vs. quantile 1 1.12
Genetic score quantile 3 vs. quantile 1 1.33
Genetic score quantile 4 vs. quantile 1 1.62
TABLE II
CLINICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND GENETIC RISK FACTORS USED FOR
COMPUTATION OF THE CORONARY ARTERY DISEASE (CAD) RISK [3].
computation of the genetic risk (S), and (ii) 14 clinical and
environmental factors (in Table II) to compute the overall CAD
risk. Furthermore, the genetic score distribution is partitioned
into 4 genetic risk groups or quantiles (i.e., ρ = 4 in
Section V). We note that in [3], the contributions of genetic,
clinical, and environmental factors to the disease risk are
computed via a logistic regression model on a population of
2078 individuals.
We implemented the proposed system on an Intel Core
i7-2620M CPU with 2.70 GHz processor under Windows 7
Operating System. We set the size of the security parameter
(n in Paillier cryptosystem in Section III-C) to 4096 bits. The
security parameters of the DGK cryptosystem are set to the
following values: L = 16, t = 160, k = 1024. Our imple-
mentation relies on a MySQL 5.5 database managed by the
open source tool MySQL Workbench. To provide a platform-
independent implementation, we used the Java programming
language along with the open-source Integrated Development
Environment, NetBeans IDE 7.1.1., for the implementation of
the Java code.13 In Table III, we summarize the computational
and storage complexities of the proposed solution.
We emphasize that the encryption of the variants at the CI
(using the modified Paillier cryptosystem) is a one-time opera-
tion and is significantly faster than sequencing and analysis of
the sequence. Further, this encryption can be conducted much
more efficiently by pre-computing some parameters, such as
(gr, hr) pairs, for various r values, for each patient. Indeed, by
pre-computing (gr, hr) pairs, we observed that the encryption
takes only 0.168 ms. per attribute at the CI. All these numbers
show that our privacy-preserving algorithm is very realistic and
could be implemented with current computing technology.
Finally, in Fig. 5, we illustrate two screen shots from our im-
plementation in which we illustrate the operations conducted
13We note that our code for the implementation is not optimized, and better
results can be expected with an optimized implementation.
at the patient (P ) and medical unit (MU), respectively.14
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a framework in which
patients’ genomic, clinical, and environmental data is securely
stored at a storage and processing unit, and in which a
medical unit conducts disease risk tests on this encrypted
data by using homomorphic encryption and privacy-preserving
integer comparison. We have shown that the proposed system
preserves the privacy of the patients against a curious party at
the storage and processing unit and a malicious party at the
medical unit. We have also implemented the proposed solution
and shown its practicality. We believe that the proposed
privacy-preserving disease risk test would encourage the use
of genomic, clinical, and environmental data in medical tests
by ensuring the patients that the privacy of their sensitive data
will be preserved.
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